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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
Respondents, Donald T. Vaughn, the District Attorney of 
Philadelphia County, and the Attorney General of 
Pennsylvania, whom we will call collectively the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeal from an order 
entered November 6, 1996, in the district court in favor of 
petitioner, Attila Orban. The district court order granted 
Orban's petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the extent of 
vacating his convictions and sentences entered in state 
court following a nonjury trial for aggravated assault and 
recklessly endangering another person (two counts on each 
charge) arising out of a motor vehicle accident in which 
three people were killed and two others injured. The district 
court predicated its order on its conclusion that the vacated 
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. The 
order in all other respects denied Orban's petition. It also 
directed that he be released from custody unless the state 
court resentenced him on his remaining convictions arising 
from the accident. We reject the district court's conclusion 
that the convictions were not supported by sufficient 
evidence. Therefore, we will reverse the order of the district 
court to the extent that it granted Orban habeas corpus 
relief. 
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I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Orban brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. On 
this appeal, we exercise plenary review over the district 
court's legal conclusions. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 
1242 (3d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, inasmuch as the district 
court relied on the state court record in concluding that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, we will 
exercise plenary review of that conclusion. See Jackson v. 
Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
2442 (1997). 
 
II. FACTUAL HISTORY 
 
On Sunday, April 20, 1990, Orban was traveling north in 
his truck on Interstate 95 in Philadelphia. He drove his 
vehicle across three lanes of traffic and then hit and 
crossed the guardrail and struck a car heading south. 
Three occupants of the car hit by Orban were killed and the 
other two were injured seriously. 
 
Several eyewitnesses testified at the nonjury trial in this 
case. Edmond F. McGowan, who also was driving north on 
Route 95, observed Orban's truck rapidly approaching from 
his rear, traveling at approximately 65-70 miles per hour. 
When McGowan observed Orban "going back and forth" 
within the right hand lane and even crossing the dotted line 
into the next lane, he changed lanes to avoid Orban's 
vehicle. After Orban passed McGowan, McGowan saw 
Orban proceeding in the right hand lane for one quarter 
mile without weaving. Then McGowan saw Orban suddenly 
make a 90-degree turn across all lanes of traffic and into 
and over the guardrail. Frank Sprangle and Steven Siegel 
testified that they observed Orban weaving in traffic and 
suddenly hit and jump over the guardrail. 
 
At the scene of the accident Orban offered three different 
explanations for his behavior. He said that someone had 
struck his truck from behind, a friend had been driving the 
truck, and he must have fallen asleep at the wheel. Orban, 
however, later abandoned these explanations. At trial, he 
stated that his truck may have been hit from behind 
causing his head to hit the windshield, and he may have 
 
                                3 
experienced a diabetic seizure which rendered him 
unconscious and unable to control the vehicle. 
 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Based on these facts, the state trial judge convicted 
Orban of three counts of homicide by vehicle, two counts of 
aggravated assault, and two counts of recklessly 
endangering another person. Commonwealth v. Orban, Nos. 
1698-1707, Feb. Term, 1991 (Phil. C.P. 1991). The court 
sentenced Orban to a total sentence of 7 to 15 years for the 
aggravated assault and homicide by vehicle convictions, but 
suspended his sentence on the reckless endangerment 
counts. On July 3, 1992, the trial judge filed a 
comprehensive opinion explaining why its verdict should 
not be disturbed. 
 
Orban appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
where he claimed that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict. He further contended that his counsel 
ineffectively represented him at trial because he failed to 
present a defense of unconsciousness brought about by 
diabetic seizure. In January 1993, the Superior Court filed 
an opinion affirming Orban's convictions. The court 
concluded that Orban waived his argument with respect to 
the weight of the evidence, which in any event was 
meritless, and that the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim failed for lack of specificity. Commonwealth v. Orban, 
626 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (table). The court did 
not make a specific disposition of Orban's insufficiency of 
evidence argument, though it plainly rejected that 
argument, indicating that the trial court's post-trial opinion 
"properly and adequately" addressed the issues he raised. 
In that opinion, the trial court found that the 
Commonwealth proved Orban's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Of course, the Superior Court's conclusion that the 
verdict was not against the weight of the evidence 
necessarily meant that it concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the verdict. Orban then filed a petition 
for allocatur with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which 
that court denied. Orban v. Commonwealth, 627 A.2d 180 
(Pa. 1993) (table). 
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In February 1994, Orban filed an action in the common 
pleas court under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief 
Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 (West Supp. 
1997), seeking relief from his convictions, but the common 
pleas court dismissed that action. Commonwealth v. Orban, 
No. 1698-1707, Feb. Term, 1991 (Phil. C.P. 1994). In June 
1994, Orban appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
claiming that: (1) the trial judge should have ordered PCRA 
counsel to amend the petition to state a claim other than 
the previously litigated ineffectiveness claim; (2) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call Orban's physician 
as a witness to testify regarding his diabetic condition; and 
(3) post-verdict counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
his physician and trial counsel at the hearing on the post- 
verdict motions. On March 8, 1995, the Superior Court 
affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. Commonwealth v. Orban, 
No. 2387 Phil. 1994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 
Orban then filed a petition for allocatur with the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. While that petition was 
pending he also filed a petition in the Supreme Court 
seeking leave to supplement his petition for allocatur so 
that he could rely on Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d 
616 (Pa. 1995), which the Supreme Court decided shortly 
before the Superior Court affirmed the order denying him 
PCRA relief. Orban understandably wanted to rely on 
O'Hanlon as that case defined recklessness in an 
aggravated assault case in a rather confined manner. The 
Supreme Court denied both the petition to supplement and 
the petition for allocatur on July 26, 1995. Commonwealth 
v. Orban, No. 0251 E.D. Alloc. Docket (Pa. 1995). 
 
Orban then filed this habeas corpus action in the district 
court in September 1995, claiming that: 
 
1. the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
convictions for aggravated assault and reckless 
endangerment; 
 
2. the trial court deprived him of due process by 
inferring that petitioner was driving in a reckless 
manner; 
 
3. trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call a 
physician who could have testified in support of 
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petitioner's defense that petitioner's diabetic condition 
was a possible cause of the accident; and 
 
4. PCRA counsel was ineffective because he presented 
in the collateral action a claim of ineffective counsel 
that had been resolved on direct appeal. 
 
The district court referred the petition to a magistrate 
judge, who issued a report on February 5, 1996, 
recommending its denial. On November 6, 1996, the district 
court granted the petition in part, based on itsfinding that 
the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated 
assault and reckless endangerment convictions. The court, 
however, rejected Orban's claims regarding the homicide by 
vehicle counts and ineffective assistance of counsel, and he 
has not cross-appealed to advance those claims before us. 
The district court stayed execution of its order to give the 
Commonwealth an opportunity to appeal, which it did, on 




For Orban to raise a claim in federal court, he must have 
presented the claim at each level of the state courts. See 
Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 678 (3d. Cir. 1996). In his 
federal habeas corpus action, Orban raised the applicability 
of the definition of recklessness in an aggravated assault 
action as set forth in Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d 
616. But the first time Orban specifically raised the 
applicability of O'Hanlon in the state courts was when he 
sought to supplement his second petition for allocatur in 
the Supreme Court. However, Orban could not have raised 
O'Hanlon much earlier because the Supreme Court decided 
O'Hanlon less than two months before the Superior Court 
affirmed the order denying Orban's PCRA motion. The 
district court entertained Orban's O'Hanlon argument as it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court order was procedurally defective because it "vacated" 
Orban's conviction and dismissed the charges against him with 
prejudice. The court could not grant such relief in a proceeding under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31, 83 S.Ct. 822, 844 
(1963); Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1988); Rimmer v. 
Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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found the argument to be substantially the same as the 
legal theory Orban argued throughout his state 
proceedings, i.e., that his actions " `lack[ ] the indicators of 
deliberate . . . disregard found necessary by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in O'Hanlon.' " While the 
Commonwealth challenges this conclusion by the district 
court, we will assume without deciding that it was correct 
and we will consider O'Hanlon in deciding this case.2 
 
Orban contends that the Commonwealth's evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated 
assault and recklessly endangering another person because 
the Commonwealth did not prove that he possessed the 
requisite mental state to be guilty of those offenses. Thus, 
in his view, his convictions on these charges denied him 
due process of law. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
315-16, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979). On this appeal we 
determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. 
We must apply the above standard "with explicit reference 
to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 
defined by state law." Id. at 324 n.16, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 
n.16. 
 
Under Pennsylvania Law, a person is guilty of aggravated 
assault if he "attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2702 (a)(1)(West Supp. 1997). Inasmuch as the 
Commonwealth does not argue that Orban acted 
intentionally or knowingly, our inquiry is whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As in Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 1997), the parties 
have briefed the case and the district court decided the case without 
reference to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), even though the district 
court decided the case after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. 
They may have been prescient in that regard. See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 
S.Ct. 2059 (1997). We, too, will decide the case without reference to that 
Act which certainly cannot have strengthened Orban's position. See 
Johnson, slip op. at 9. 
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evidence supported a conclusion that Orban acted 
recklessly in circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life. The statutory 
definition of recklessness is that: 
 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material 
element of an offense when he consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk 
must be of such nature and degree that, considering 
the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor's 
situation. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 302(b)(3)(West 1983). 
 
O'Hanlon sets forth the degree of recklessness required to 
support an aggravated assault conviction under 
Pennsylvania law: 
 
[M]ere recklessness is insufficient to support a 
conviction for aggravated assault, which requires a 
higher degree of culpability, i.e., that which considers 
then disregards the threat necessarily posed to human 
life by the offending conduct. There must be an 
element of deliberation or conscious disregard of 
danger not present to the same extent in, e.g., either 
reckless endangerment . . . or driving while intoxicated. 
 
O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d. at 618. For a defendant to act with the 
degree of recklessness required for an aggravated assault 
conviction, the offensive act must be performed under 
circumstances which "almost insure that injury or death 
will ensue . . . . This state of mind is, accordingly, 
equivalent to that which seeks to cause injury . . . only one 
step short of murder. Aggravated assault is, indeed, the 
functional equivalent of a murder in which, for some 
reason, death fails to occur." Id. at 618. In O'Hanlon, the 
defendant ran a red light while he was driving drunk and 
hit another vehicle, seriously injuring the other driver and 
himself. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the 
defendant's behavior was not so egregious to be considered 
the equivalent of homicide. Id. at 618. 
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The O'Hanlon court discussed a number of cases in 
which defendants had the state of mind required under 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702(a)(1) to be guilty of aggravated 
assault. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 354 A.2d 538 (Pa. 
1976) (defendant fired a gun into crowd killing one man 
and injuring another); Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 
204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (defendant drove car into a crowd 
after having aimed it at one individual and then hit two 
people). 
 
Most similar to this case is Commonwealth v. Scofield, 
521 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). In Scofield, the 
defendant's car "scrap[ed] up against the left front bumper 
[of a car] that was parked on the east side of Broad Street 
. . . . [The car] traveled another ten feet in this manner 
before swerving onto to the sidewalk and striking a 
building." Id. at 41. During this incident, the defendant ran 
over and severely injured a pedestrian. Afterwards, the 
defendant attempted to put his car in reverse and drive 
away. Id. at 41. The court found that Scofield's erratic 
driving prior to the accident established that he was 
reckless, and his actions in leaving the scene showed that 
he was fully aware of what had occurred. Id. at 42. 
 
A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Orban's 
actions were even more egregious than the actions of the 
defendant in Scofield. After driving unpredictably in a much 
longer distance than the distance involved in Scofield, 
Orban drove his truck across three lanes of traffic and hit 
the guardrail. The truck then flew through the air, landing 
on top of a car. Orban's erratic driving prior to the accident, 
which caused McGowan to take steps to avoid him, and his 
inexplicable driving at the time of the accident, show that 
he exhibited the conscious disregard of danger required by 
O'Hanlon to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault. 
Furthermore, unlike the defendant in O'Hanlon who was 
drunk at the time of the accident, there was no explanation 
for Orban's conduct that might negate the required mens 
rea for recklessness under the statute. As the state trial 
court said in its July 3, 1992 opinion, "[Orban] offered no 
plausible reason for this criminally negligent and reckless 
behavior." The evidence is therefore sufficient to establish 
Orban's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus his 
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conviction for aggravated assault was proper even under 
O'Hanlon. In short, we see no reason why the state court 
could not judge the character of Orban's act, i.e., his 
reckless disregard of human life, by what he did even 
though there is no explanation for why he did it. 
 
We recognize that in a motor vehicle collision case it 
would be expected that a driver rarely would have the state 
of mind necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated 
assault. After all, completely noncriminal driving can bring 
about the most disastrous consequences. Nevertheless, 
there is no question but that a driver can commit an 
aggravated assault. In this unusual case, the absence of 
circumstances sufficient to negate the required mens rea 
justified the trial court in concluding that Orban acted with 
the state of mind required by O'Hanlon to be guilty of 
aggravated assault. 
 
Orban also contends that his convictions for recklessly 
endangering another person were based upon insufficient 
evidence in violation of due process. Reckless 
endangerment consists of "recklessly engag[ing] in conduct 
which places or may place another person in danger of 
death or serious bodily injury." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2705 (West 1983). Unlike aggravated assault, however, a 
conviction for recklessly endangering another person does 
not require that the prosecution show that the defendant 
acted in "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life." 
 
Orban's actions justified his convictions for reckless 
endangerment. Pennsylvania courts frequently have found 
that motor vehicle drivers exhibited the required level of 
recklessness while driving to justify a conviction for 
recklessly endangering another person. In In Interest of 
Becker, 536 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), the defendant 
and his friend were in separate cars traveling either side by 
side or closely following one another. Id. at 1372-73. While 
the friend's car ran a red light and killed the driver of a 
different car, the defendant stopped at the light and was in 
the correct driving lane. Id. at 1371. However, the evidence 
of the defendant's uncontrolled driving prior to the accident 
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was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant 
recklessly endangered other drivers on the road. 3 
 
In Commonwealth v. Henck, 478 A.2d 465 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984), a police officer stopped the defendant for driving 
straight through an intersection rather than turning right 
as the road required. Then, as the officer returned to his 
vehicle, the defendant sped away, ran a stop sign, and cut 
off several other vehicles. The court found that the evidence 
of the defendant's running through a stop sign and 
blocking the path of other drivers while fleeing from a police 
officer was sufficient to sustain a conviction for recklessly 
endangering another person even though no one was 
injured. See also Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (possessing and brandishing a 
weapon, combined with a struggle over control of the 
weapon and a threat to kill two people, was sufficient to 
convict the defendant for recklessly endangering another 
person). 
 
The facts in this case were more dramatic than those in 
the cases we discuss above and demonstrate that Orban's 
convictions for recklessly endangering another person were 
proper. Orban was in his truck cutting across multiple 
lanes of traffic just prior to the accident, and in doing so he 
posed an extremely dangerous threat to other drivers. 
Orban's erratic driving which resulted in the death of three 
people and injury to two others establishes that the 





We are satisfied that Orban's actions justify his 
convictions for aggravated assault and for recklessly 
endangering another person. The district court's order 
entered November 6, 1996, to the extent it granted Orban's 
petition for habeas corpus and vacated his convictions for 
aggravated assault and recklessly endangering another 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Superior Court nevertheless reversed his adjudication of 
delinquency on the ground that he had not been charged properly with 
the offense of which he was convicted. 
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person will be reversed. Thus, we will remand the case to 
the district court to enter an order reinstating the judgment 
of conviction and sentence entered in the state court. 
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